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Article 6
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The conclusion seems inevitable, then, that the improper overruling of
demurrers to a complaint containing both good and insufficient paragraphs does not amount to reversible error where there is a special finding
or a special verdict, and a defendant can have no grounds for complaint
if such findings are supported by evidence properly admissible under a
good paragraph. In fact, under the cases last cited even if the judgment
were based upon a general verdict and some or all of the paragraphs
of the complaint were faulty, the judgment would stand if the evidence
showed a right to the relief given and was either properly admissible
under a good paragraph (since such evidence should have the same effect
as that admitted without objection) or was admitted improperly but
without objection.
W.H.H.
ADoPTIoN-DOMICM --IFANT--RESiDENCE--The infant daughter of
parents domiciled in X county was sent by her mother, after the death of
her father, to live with appellants in Y county. The mother died a few
days thereafter on May 16, 1930. On this same day the parents of the
mother filed a verified petition for the adoption of said child in the circuit
court of X county, and on June 2, 1930, an order of adoption was entered
by said court.
Meanwhile the appellants had filed their verified petition in the circuit
court of Y county on May 23, 1930, for the adoption of said child, and on
that day an order of adoption was entered. On June 12, 1930, the aforesaid grandparents of the child who has procured the order of adoption
in X county, filed a verified petition in the circuit court of Y county,
asking said court to vacate its order of adoption of May 23, 1930. After
hearing the evidence, the court of Y county did vacate its order on the
ground that since the child was not a "resident" of Y county, the court
there had no jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption. The statute in
question reads as follows: "Any person desirous of adopting any child
may file his petiffion therefor in the circuit court in the county where
such child resides."' Appellants appealed after motion for a new trial
was overruled. Held, judgment affirmed. The word "resides" as used in
the statute refers to "domicile" of the child.2
The legal domicile of the child was obviously in X county. An infant
not being sui juris is incapable of fixing or changing its domicile.3 The
domicile of an infant is that of its father during his lifetime, and at his
death becomes that of the mother.4 If both parents have died, the domicile
last derived from them continues to be the domicile of the child until it
reaches majority and effects a change thereof, or until said domicile is
changed by law. 5
The troublesome question is encountered in attempting to ascertain the
intended meaning of the word "resides" as used by the legislature. Was
I2 Burns' R. S. 1926, Sec. 913.
,Johnmon v. Smith, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 11, 1932, 180 N. E. 188.
S Warren v. Hofer (1859), 13 Ind. 167.
4Inre
Thorne (1925), 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630.
5
See Hiestand v. Kuns (1847), 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 345; Warren v.Hofer (1859),
13 Ind. 167, and Whee~er v. Burrows (1862), 18 Ind. 14.
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it intended to refer to the actual and technical "residence" of the child, or
was it used as synonymous with legal "domicile"?
Bouvier defines "domicile" as "that place where a man has his true,
fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning."6 Of "residence" he
writes as follows: "A residence is different from a domicile, although it is
a matter of great importance in determining the place of domicile. The
essential difference between residence and domicile is that the first involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which one has taken up
his abode ceases. * * * If his intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished,
it is his residence." 7 Thus it is apparent that the predominating feature
in determining one's domicile is intent. As state in In re Green's Estate,8
"residence is preserved by the act, domicile by the intention." While
a person can have but one domicile at a time, he may have concurrently
a residence in one place and a domicile in another.9 He may have several
residences at one time, but only one domicile.10 The peculiar element that
distinguishes domicile from mere residence is well emphasized by the
statement that "domicile expresses the legal relation existing between a
person and the place where he has, in contemplation of law, his permanent
home,"" while residence is often used to denote mere temporary sojourn
in a place. In view of these fundamental rules, it is obvious that although
the domicile of the child in question was in X county, its residence was
unmistakably in Y county where it was actually making its abode.
One writer has expressed the question of statutory interpretation as
follows: "The word 'domicile,' although so often used and commented
upon by our courts, is rarely to be met with in our constitutions or legislative enactments. 'Residence' is the favorite term employed by the
American legislator to express the connection between person and place,
its exact signification being left to construction, to be determined from the
context and apparent object sought to be attained by the enactment. It
is to be regretted that these lights are often very feeble, and that not a
little confusion has been introduced into our jurisprudence by the different
courts with regard to the exact force of this and similar words when
applied to substantially the same subject-matter. 'Residence,' when used
in statutes is generally construed to mean 'domicile.' * * * This is
especially true with regard to the subjects of voting, eligibility to office,
taxation, jurisdiction in divorce, probate and administration, etc."12
The Indiana cases substantiate the foregoing analysis. "Residence" as
a qualification for voting privileges has been decided to refer to "domicile."1 3 The word "inhabitant" as used in a section of the statutes
67 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd Revision, p. 915.
Idem., p. 2920. Also see Shaefer v. Gilbert (1890), 20 At. 434.
'164 N.Y. S. 1063, 1073 (1917).
'Croop v. Walton (1927), 199 Ind. 262, 157 N. E. 275.
See Hayward v. Hayward (1917), 65 Ind. App. 440, 115 X. E. 966.
"Jacobs on Domicile, See. 72.
1Idem, Sec. 75.
"Maddox v. State (1869), 32 Ind. 111. (This case is also of historical interest
in so far as it considered the domicile of a master as being that of his infant apprentice.) Quinn v. State (1871), 35 Ind. 485.
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regarding taxation' 4 has been held to mean one "domiciled" within the
state. 15 On the other hand, a statute providing that "Whoever kidnaps,
or forcibly or fraudulently carries off or decoys from his place of residence,
or arrests or imprisons any person, with the intention of having such
person carried away from his place of residence, unless it be in pursuance
of laws of this state or the United States, is guilty of kidnapping.
*

*

*"16 was for obvious reasons construed not to refer to the legal

"domicile" of the kidnapped individual. The court said "the evident purpose was rather to provide against the kidnapping of a person from any
place where he has a right to be, whether that be the place of his temP. J.D.
porary sojourn or permanent domicile."17
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS CLAusE-Appellant is a Wisconsin corporation licensed to carry on the business of writing fire insurance
in Minnesota. A fire insurance policy was issued to appellee's assignor
by appellant which was in the standard form as required by a Minnesota
statute, which provided that all insurance policies issued by fire insurance
companies licensed to do business in Minnesota should contain a provision
for determining by arbitration the amount of any loss (except total loss
of building) when the parties fail to agree as to the amount. The statute
provided for the method of selecting appraisors and an umpire by both
parties and also made a provision applicable to the selection in case one
party refused to take part. The decision by this board, unless grossly excessive, or inadequate, or procured by fraud, was by this statute made
conclusive as to the amount of the loss but not as to the liability under
the policy.1 The insured's property was damaged by fire and a demand was
made on appellant to have the amount of the loss determined by arbitration as provided for in the policy. Appellant refused to participate in the
arbitration and appellee proceeded to have the arbitrators selected and the
amount determined by the statutory method provided for in such a case.
This suit was brought to recover the amount of the award. The appellant
contends, and it is the single point relied upon, that so much of the statute
as requires appellant to use the arbitration provision of the policy and
makes the award thus found conclusive is a violation of the due process
and equal protection of laws clauses of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This contention was rejected by the Minnesota
appeal was taken to the United States Supreme
Supreme Court 2 and an
2
Court. Held, affirmed. a
The Supreme Court of the United States has never attempted a precise
definition of the term "due process of law" although the term has often
1

,Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926. See. 14050.
Croop v. Walton (1927), 199 Ind. 262, 157 N. E. 275 (wherein Martin, J., has
made16 a comprehensive discussion of the problem of domicile and residence).
Burns' R. S. 1894, Sec. 1988.
11Wallace v. State (1890), 147 Ind. 621, 47 N. B. 13.
15

1 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, Sees. 3314, 3366. 3512, 3515, 3711.
2Glidden Company v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minnesota (1930),

181 Minn. 518, 233 N. W. 310.
2aHardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Glidden Company
(1931), 284 U. S. 151, 62 Sup. Ct. 69.

